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Migration and the policy of admission of aliens into political communities is increasingly 
recognised as a key issue of both political agendas and academic debates. As a political 
issue, migration is at the centre of a controversy where the proponents of more open policies 
argue against tight border controls on grounds that are often composed of multiple 
components. Economic theses are frequently mixed with cultural, political, legal, or security 
arguments. Pragmatic approaches are often entangled with ideological stances, idealistic 
attitudes, or racist positions. All of this contributes to create a burning situation that not only 
heats political debates but sometimes also descends to the streets. As a theoretical issue, 
migration is equally controversial for it intersects a core node of political theory, namely the 
notion of citizenship. According to liberalism, individuals are entitled to a set of rights 
including the right to mobility, and yet this right is constrained by an equally recognised 
right to collective self-determination and national autonomy. This tension is more and more 
problematic in a world in which individual human rights are on the rise and state sovereignty 
is in decline in many respects – except for the issue of immigration. 
 
In response to these disputes, this straight-to-the-point essay offers a consequentialist 
cosmopolitan reading of the right to universal mobility that intends to avoid the risk of 
arbitrary or asymmetric positions. It argues that migrants’ rights to freedom of movement 
have to be considered as a prima facie cosmopolitan right, a right that ought to be politically 
recognised and that contributes to individual well-being and subsequently to world welfare. 
However, the paper also maintains that such right has to be balanced against a prima facie 
equally valid right of original residents to preserve their societal political project, for this 
contributes to individual well-being and subsequently to world social welfare, too. 
Deploying similar reasons, both migrants’ and residents’ claims then ultimately derive their 
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legitimacy from a single principle of global justice, that of maximising social welfare by 
guaranteeing freedom of choice on different political levels. Hence, a fair political system 
ought to symmetrically balance these two contrasting claims by appealing to their common 
principle of justice. 
 
 
FREEDOM OF CHOICE AND THE VALUE OF CITIZENSHIP 
 
Liberalism is centered on the primacy of individual freedom of choice, in that the cardinal 
value that political arrangements have to pursue is individual liberty. In this paper, I present 
a consequentialist and welfarist understanding of freedom of choice according to which each 
individual is entitled to achieve and develop the status of independent choice-maker1. Since 
the individual capacity for choice between different life options is considered the most viable 
indicator of well-being, individual rights are deemed to be the most reliable instrument to 
achieve the greatest social welfare. In order to guarantee each individual his or her personal 
capability to choose freely and thus to pursue his or her own well-being, a number of specific 
social and political reforms need to be envisaged. Here I will concentrate on those reforms 
that touch freedom of choice as applied to the case of political participation in the public 
decision-making processes at each level of political action. These rights are intended as 
multilayered prerogatives to be granted to each citizen. 
 
Migration is here examined with reference to the political dimension of movement 
concerning the issue of admission into a foreign political society, thus of acquisition of 
citizenship. Within this context, citizenship is understood as a set of legal entitlements 
allowing for freedom of choice and full membership of the political community. This set is 
based on a fundamental principle of equality and reciprocity, and is impartially guaranteed to 
every member of the polity. Insofar as for members of the collective exercising self-
governance is usually recognised as the minimal precondition for democratic life, the 
acquisition of this set of rights is considered crucial to effective participation in social and 
political life2. When migrants are deprived of citizenship rights they are de jure excluded 
from the political community and suffer a subaltern status. 
 
In order to grasp the meaning of the current proposal, it is fundamental to notice that current 
international customary law grants to the state an absolute right to refuse admission into its 
citizenry and territory. Provided no relevant conventions or humanitarian measures are 
                                            
1 For more on the normative foundation of this position refer to Raffaele Marchetti, "Consequentialist 
Cosmopolitanism and Global Political Agency," in Global Ethics and Civil Society, in J. Eade and D. 
O'Byrne, (eds.) (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), pp. 57-73. 
2 Gerard Delanty, Citizenship in a Global Age: Society, Culture, Politics (Philadelphia, PA: Open 
University Press, 2000), § 1-2; Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, "A Return of the Citizen: A 
Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory," Ethics, 104 (1994), pp. 352-81. 
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applicable3, the refusal to admit aliens is never an illicit act. However, such a statist position 
is increasingly under pressure both from a normative point of view for its inconsistency with 
fundamental principles of impartiality and as a matter of fact given that increasing numbers 
of states recognise the possibility of double or even multiple citizenship4. One way of re-
interpreting the tension between universal and national claims concerning the issue of 
immigration consists in progressively imposing limits on state sovereignty according to 
international or intergovernmental laws. Usually this interpretation implies considering 
migrants as aliens, or non-citizens and non-subjects, the state being accepted as the only 
agent entitled to confer such privileged status. This approach typically corresponds to the 
image of concentric circles, with a small social group (or even the family) constituting the 
smallest of these circles. Subsequently, progressive enlargements are envisaged. In 
diametrical opposition to such an exclusionary mechanism, this paper advocates an approach 
that is cosmopolitan and all-inclusive from the beginning5. Migrants are not non-citizens 
with only narrowly circumscribed rights; but they are cosmopolitan citizens entitled, as much 
as ‘permanent’ residents are, to participate in the decision-making processes world-wide 
which extend to different spheres of political action. In other words, individuals come first 
whereas states remain political devices for the promotion of social welfare. In order to unfold 
such a position it is, however, necessary to examine more carefully the ground on which both 
residents’ and migrants’ claims are traditionally based, namely the issue of citizenship. 
 
 
LEGITIMACY OF RESIDENTS’ CLAIMS 
 
The claims of citizens to control entrance into their national territory are based on the 
principle of self-determination. According to this principle, a group is entitled to collectively 
decide over its destiny, including its membership. This reasoning constitutes an extension of 
the individual right to freedom of choice to the collective domain. Such group prerogatives 
usually rely on a liberal-communitarian argument holding that a political project is necessary 
for imbuing individual lives with meaning and that a genuine political project can only be 
carried out in the vernacular, i.e. at the local/state level. 
 
From the perspective of this paper, the liberal-communitarian argument only has derivative 
force. It is warranted provided it is conducive to social well-being. Genuine communitarian 
scholars, however, do no deploy such an instrumental reading. If a strict, non-instrumental 
communitarian perspective is maintained, then the state-centric point of view should be 
rejected for at least two reasons, which in different ways concern the principle of non-
                                            
3 It has to be noticed that a number of international conventions impose limits on state sovereignty, 
according to the principle of non-discrimination. Yet, only very rarely do they comment on issues of 
admission, except in the case of reunion of minors to parents and refugees. 
4 Saskia Sassen, "Beyond Sovereignty: De-facto Transnationalism in Immigration Policy," European 
Journal of Migration Law, 1, no. 2 (1999), pp. 177-98. 
5 Raffaele Marchetti, "Interaction-Dependent Justice and the Problem of International Exclusion," 
Constellations, 12, no. 4 (2005), pp. 487-501. 
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discrimination. Firstly, by conceding an almost absolute privilege to original residents, state-
centric policies do not recognise the supervenience of the principle of impartial consideration 
of each individual right on equal opportunity of choice. Secondly, the nationalist orientation 
should be rejected for the way it intentionally discriminates among would-be migrants, 
admitting only those who satisfy entry requirements shaped to the needs of the receiving 
countries. Both reasons ultimately affect the guarantee of individual freedom of choice and 
thus the overall promotion of social well-being. 
 
 
LEGITIMACY OF MIGRANTS’ CLAIMS 
 
Similarly to the case of resident citizens, migrants’ claims are fundamentally based on the 
recognition of universal rights. Freedom of movement is usually included in the set of 
fundamental individual rights that are crucial for human dignity and for full participation in 
the political life of a community. Traditionally applied to the domestic domain only, the 
value of universal mobility is mostly evident when it is denied. An important criticism of 
dictatorial regimes concerns, in fact, their restrictive attitude toward mobility within and 
beyond national territory. As much as other domains of freedom of choice, freedom of 
movement remains a key component for the enhancement of individual, and thus of social 
well-being. 
 
From the perspective of this paper, this liberal-universalist reading of the right to mobility 
also only has derivative force, i.e. it is warranted provided it is conducive to social well-
being. Genuine ‘open-borders’ scholars, however, do not deploy such instrumental reading. 
If a strict, non-instrumental universalist perspective is maintained, the radical alternative of 
open borders should be refused for a number of distinct reasons related to the impartial 
dealing with both migrants and receiving populations. Note that these reasons are of a 
hypothetical nature, for they invoke possible but not empirically provable scenarios 
associated with the sudden fall of borders. Concerning migrants, the policy of completely 
open borders here and now could be self-defeating, in so far as it could subvert the 
expectations of would-be migrants themselves who expect to arrive into a specific country 
with distinct socio-economical characteristics. As for local residents, a similar line of 
argument applies, for their expectations should also be taken into account and with equal 
weight. Were borders suddenly and completely open, a possible result could be a substantial 
re-shaping of social identity and of the entire state structure, with potentially huge social 





It is now time to re-construct a legitimate normative framework to deal with the migration 
issue from a global perspective. The task here consists in investigating which institutional 
setting would best serve the promotion of freedom on a global level. Since institutions serve 
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to ultimately promote social welfare via individual freedom of choice, alternative 
institutional schemes should be assessed in terms of the access they accord individuals to the 
status of free choice-makers. Consequently, different rights-related claims have to be re-
assessed from this global and all-inclusive perspective. 
 
With regards to the political reading of migration, the starting point of the cosmopolitan 
argument on the movement of people stems from a prescriptive observation. 
Cosmopolitanism affirms that the scope of justice should be universal as no discrimination is 
justified when considering the ultimate rights of every citizen to control his destiny, i.e. to 
equal individual self-determination. In this vein, individual freedom of choice and 
subsequent political entitlements to take part in the public decision-making process at all 
political levels form the normative core of the cosmopolitan criteria to assess international 
affairs. Underpinning this is the fundamental ethical postulate regarding impartiality that 
demands the extension of the application of the norm regarding individual non-
discrimination to the global level6. In fact, in order to preserve his/her individual autonomy 
via freedom of choice, the agent needs to extend his political entitlements to the totality of 
the sphere of political action7. Individuals need to have a political voice in different spheres 
of political action (beyond those traditionally limited by the national territory) to have their 
freedom of choice best preserved. In order to comply with the requirements of global justice, 
such an extension of rights needs to be balanced, on an equal footing, against the political 
entitlements of other social actors. 
 
These considerations lead us to question the mainstream framework, which considers 
migration only a national issue and gives priority to residents’ claims. According to 
cosmopolitanism, this move constitutes a prejudicial limitation of the original question that 
inevitably delivers a distorted and biased answer, in which the migrant remains on an 
unequal standing. As an alternative to this, a radical repositioning of the receiving countries 
is developed and an equalising balance is struck between migrants and residents. This 
change of perspective calls for an equal status of cosmopolitan citizenship for migrants and 
resident citizens. Moreover, we can derive a right to free passage with regard to the 
movement of people. 
 
A cosmopolitan citizenship characterised by these rights becomes de facto a crucial 
institutional factor for individuals to increase (but sometimes even simply to exercise) their 
autonomy to choose differing life options, and their capability to govern the socio-political 
domain by changing their place of residence. Much as at the domestic level the right to 
movement within the national territory has proved crucial in the self-realisation of one’s 
                                            
6 Robert Goodin, "If People Were Money..." in Free Movement. Ethical Issues in the Transnational 
Migration of People and of Money., in B. Barry and R. Goodin, (eds.) (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1992), pp. 6-22; Peter Singer and Renata Singer, "The Ethics of Refugees Policy," in 
Open borders? Closed societies?: the Ethical and Political Issues, in M. Gibney, (eds.) (New York: 
Greenwood, 1988), pp. 111-30. 
7 Raffaele Marchetti, "Human Rights as Global Participatory Entitlements," in Between Cosmopolitan 
Ideals and State Sovereignty. Studies on Global Justice, in R. Tinnevelt and G. Verschraegen, (eds.) 
(London: Palgrave, 2006), pp. 159-69. 
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personal projects and political participation, an equivalent international right would be 
equally beneficial to the well-being of the individual in terms of choice opportunities and 
political control of one’s own life8. 
 
Nonetheless, for this to satisfy the global democratic requirements concerning multilevel 
dimensionality, an impartial weighting mechanism between the claims of migrants and those 
of local citizens has to be simultaneously envisaged. Having argued for a universal right to 
movement, it is here necessary to point out again that such a right has to be inserted into a 
wider institutional political framework, in which other kinds of rights also have legitimate 
claims. While migrants and residents are equal on the basis of a fundamental right to the 
protection of freedom of choice, they nonetheless differ in that the social value of their 
relative institutional entitlements concerning national citizenship can become unbalanced. 
National prerogatives can at times create a sub-optimal result in terms of social welfare if 
they are not properly weighed with the political entitlements of non-nationals. This case is 
similar in many respects to the familiar situation of welfare state provision, in which a set of 
secondary rights of one group conflicts with secondary entitlements of another group, despite 
both counterparts having fundamentally equal claims to well-being. In cases like this, some 
sort of impartial comparative assessment made by a public, all-inclusive institution is needed 
in order to solve the controversy. Similarly at the global level, an all-inclusive institution has 
to be envisaged in order to provide a legitimate resolution mechanism to solve the conflicts 
between residents and migrants. Ultimately, this implies endorsing the regulation of 
migration by some supra-national institution engaged in weighing the costs and benefits of 
the movement of people on their freedom of choice and therefore on the overall social 
welfare. Explorations of the institutional details and the feasibility of a world migratory 
regime that allows for such a public assessment form part of the current debate on 
international migratory management. 
                                            
8 R. Nett, "The Civil Rights We Are Not Ready For: The Right of Free Movement on the Face of the 
Earth," Ethics, 81 (1971), pp. 212-27. 
